论文

区域经济政策的博弈解析

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  • 中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所, 北京 100101
马丽(1975-),女,山西祁县人,中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所博士生,主要从事区域经济、 可持续发展方面的研究。

收稿日期: 2001-01-11

  修回日期: 2001-05-20

  网络出版日期: 2011-01-27

基金资助

中国科学院知识创新工程项目”沿海地区人地关系演化机理与调控途径研究”(KZCX2-307)

The game-theory analysis of regional econmic policy

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  • Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, CAS, Beijing 100101, China

Received date: 2001-01-11

  Revised date: 2001-05-20

  Online published: 2011-01-27

摘要

针对传统区域政策只基于目标区域利益考虑的缺陷,文章应用博弈分析的原理,分析区域分工的动力机制,以及区域政策对区域竞争和分工过程及结果的影响。主要结论是:利益是驱动分工的根本动力,如果参与分工能给区域带来利益增收,区域才会主动参与分工;分工产品的价格比是影响竞争和分工过程的主要因素,不合理的价格体系会影响或破坏合理的区域竞争和分工;单个区域所制定的政策最终将影响所有具有经济联系的相关区域。以中国“区域均衡增长”与“区域倾斜增长”两个主要区域政策的效果为例,进行了实证研究。

本文引用格式

马丽, 庞效民 . 区域经济政策的博弈解析[J]. 地理研究, 2001 , 20(4) : 498 -505 . DOI: 10.11821/yj2001040014

Abstract

As the regional problems are usually regarded as a result of'market failure', traditional regional economic policies are basically based on the assumed rationality of 'government intervention'and concerned mainly the benefit of objective area. Considering the fact that many regional policies aiming at enhancing the benefit of the objective area have resulted in the negative effect on the benefit of non objective area at the same time, we attempt to study the regional policy issue with application of game theory. Firstly, we analyze the driving forces for regional division. Based on the hypothesis that the motivation for a region to take part in the regional cooperation and division is the increased benefits, we compare the ratio of benefits to cost, and find that the exchange ratio of specialized products of two regions is the main decisive element. Then, we probe into the effect of economic policy on the dynamics of regional competition and regional division. Different regional policies will change the game model of regional competition and division through changes of regional benefits. Also, we find that the reasonable exchange ratio of specialized products in division should be based on the ratio of product cost before division. At last, we give a game theory analysis of the effect of China's regional policy. Many regional problems in the development of China's regional economy were largely the result of playing games at regional level in order to maximize each region's own benefits. Especially, unreasonable price system gave limitations to the development of regional cooperation and division.As a whole, some conclusions have been achieved as follows: (1)It is the economic benefit that motivates a region to take part in regional division. (2)The price ratio on of the specialized products is the main element that works on the process and result of regional competition and division. (3)The regional policy particularly set out for one area will influence all areas that have economic relations with it.

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