"地王"现象作为一种城市政治经济现象,是中国城市社会经济发展的必然结果。本文首先对国内外城市政治经济理论进行了回顾,然后运用其中的城市政体论与增长机器论对"地王"现象的上层建筑进行了解构,通过分析该现象背后各利益集团之间相互作用的机制,认为"地王"这一土地投机泡沫现象,是城市尺度内土地开发领域的各方政治经济群体博弈的城市政治经济后果,并且"地王"现象中的增长机器与城市政体内权力组织有以下几方面的特点:(1)地方政府在增长联盟中处于支配地位,是增长联盟的核心;(2)中央政府对增长联盟有着绝对的、最终的调控能力;(3)增长联盟与反增长联盟构成"合作—冲突"连续统。(4)增长机器与政体类型会随着地方政府财政收支平衡能力和社会国民意识的发育而发生变化,在地理或历史维度上呈现从发展政治策略到社会福利策略的时空上连续过渡。此外,与西方案例有异,中国城市政体/增长机器突破了城市内部的局限,将增长联盟的博弈从地方、场所推到了国家的层面。
As a phenomenon of urban political economy, urban primelot is an inevitable consequence of the development of urban political economy in China recently. Firstly, this paper reviews the theory of urban political economy at home and abroad; then explains the phenomenon of primelot through theories of urban regime and growth machine by analyzing the mechanism of each interest group behind this setting. It reveals that urban primelot is an urban political economy aftermath of the interactions between different political economy groups in the area of land development. This study also indicates that there are four features in this urban setting. (1) Local government is the core in this growth coalition that dominates other parts or agents/agencies, for the local offices need not care too much about their parochial civilian as well as their superior in Chinese appointed bureaucracy system. (2) The central government not only has the absolute, but final macro controls over the growth coalition as well, however, these leaders are hesitating to disorganize the local growth machines or coalitions since it may jeopardize national economic locomotive which has been lasting for over three decades since Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up policy started in 1978. (3) Growth coalition and anti-growth coalition constitute a kind of cooperate-collide continuum. The more peripheral individuals or organizations who are distributed away from the center of core-benefit in the building of growth machines might be more inclined to throw themselves into the lap of anti-growth coalition. (4) The category of urban growth machines or urban regimes might differentiate within the development of national citizenship in historical scale and the economic capacity of local governments in geographical scale. In the areas open wider to the ourside world, such as Beijing and Shanghai, the municipalities would rather build somewhat concessionary regimes/federalist regime than conserving regime/elitist entrepreneurial regime in which the local governments are hungry for development capital and dream for achievements. Therefore, according to the structure of building, dynamic machine and self-organization of growth coalitions, the nationalization process of land market might be necessary to disconnect the coalition through pumping more investment capital into local authorities from the central government or deducing the social consumption responsibility of local governments by the central government.
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