城市旧住宅区改造三方利益关系探讨：以深圳市为例

doi:10.11821/dlyj020191127

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

结合深圳的旧住宅区改造实践,以土地使用权、土地发展权及房屋价值解读为基础,探讨政府、开发商以及业主在旧住宅区改造过程中应该扮演的角色,并进一步分析当前深圳市旧住宅区改造中政府、开发商以及业主三方角色的现实关系。在此基础上,针对当前深圳市的三种旧住宅区改造模式中的三方关系进行对比剖析,发现传统市场主导模式下的旧住宅区改造中存在三方角色的“缺位”“越位”与“失位”行为是导致旧住宅区改造难以推进的核心症结所在。同时基于相对成功的鹿丹村改造模式,提出基于角色“归位”的三方角色利益平衡及“片区统筹协调”的旧住宅区改造愿景,以期为深圳市乃至全国其余大中城市中现实存在的旧住宅区改造问题提供些许思路和参考。

关键词: 城市更新, 旧住宅区改造, 土地使用权, 棚改, 角色

Abstract:

Since the reform of the housing system at the end of the 20th century, the number of commodity houses has increased sharply over the last two decades. As time goes by, the early constructed houses are now facing a set of serious issues, such as aging, environmental degradation, outdated design, and low efficiency of land use. Therefore, these old houses need to be renovated. However, it is a great challenge to deal with the intricate benefits among three major stakeholders, including the government, developer and houseowner. In order to promote the renovation of old residential areas, it is essential to uncover the complicated relationship among these three stakeholders in terms of their benefits. Through interpreting the connotation of land-use right, land development right and housing value, this paper analyzes the roles of the government, developer and houseowner that they should play during the process of the renovation of old residential areas. Furthermore, the tripartite relationship among three the stakeholders under the market-leading mode of renovation of old residential areas were revealed on the basis of the practices in Shenzhen. With a comparison with the other two modes of renovation of old residential areas in Shenzhen (i.e., Ludan-village mode and shantytown renovation mode), we found that the market-leading mode was less competitive because there exist phenomena of "role-omission", "role-offside" and "role-absence" among stakeholders. As a consequence, the benefits have been usually distributed disorderly and unevenly under the market-leading mode. In general, the houseowner lost their benefits, which have been obtained by the developer and the government. Thus, the unfair distribution of the benefits among three stakeholders hinders the process of renovation. Furthermore, on the basis of Ludan-village mode, which is regarded as a successful solution to the renovation of old residential areas in Shenzhen, a vision for the renovation as "going back to its role" has been proposed. Also, the principle of "regional coordination" is addressed under this vision. The discussion on the relationship of tripartite stakeholders in the renovation of old residential areas will contribute to enriching the research on this field and providing a useful reference for the similar issues in other cities.

Key words: urban renewal, renovation of old residential areas, land-use right, shantytown renovation, role

严东, 郭源园, 梁勇林. 城市旧住宅区改造三方利益关系探讨：以深圳市为例[J]. 地理研究, 2021, 40(3): 779-792.

YAN Dong, GUO Yuanyuan, LIANG Yonglin. The relationship of tripartite stakeholders in the renovation of old residential areas: A case study of Shenzhen[J]. GEOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH, 2021, 40(3): 779-792.

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	政府VS业主	政府VS开发商	业主VS开发商
“市场主导”模式	业主贡献原旧住宅区用地用于旧住宅区改造	政府与开发商约定土地贡献率用于配套建设,并对开发容积率、用地性质及规划、补缴地价款等提出要求	开发商与业主进行拆迁补偿、安置补偿的谈判;拆赔比是关注重点;开发商出售多余建筑面积的商品房;两者利益此消彼长（主要关系）
“鹿丹村” 模式	业主贡献原旧住宅区用地用于旧住宅区改造;两者约定一定比例的原住宅土地及建筑面积用于配套建设及回迁住宅建筑面积	以“定地价,竞容积率”方式确定开发商,开发商的最大利润被限定（主要关系）	开发商与业主进行拆迁补偿、安置补偿的谈判落实;总体拆赔比以及业主的总体回迁面积已经确定,不存在此消彼长的关系
“棚改” 模式	政府以“公共利益”名义将部分原业主旧住宅区用地用于保障性住房建设;给予原业主一定比例建筑面积的回迁商品房（主要关系）	开发商为代建者,政府承担其开发利润	无