中印边境冲突对中印双边关系、地区安全形势及全球政治局势产生深远影响，强化解析其演化博弈及机制对明晰中国周边地缘环境、维护中国国家（土）安全、揭示复杂地理情景对中印战略选择与互动模式的影响具有重要意义。本文基于国别地缘环境理论和博弈论，构建国别地缘环境视角下中印边境冲突演化博弈分析框架，以历次典型冲突事件为例，探讨演化博弈过程与揭示博弈机制。研究表明：（1） 博弈演化过程方面呈“零和-正和-零和”变化趋势，且与全球主要地缘环境变化趋势相吻合。即 ① 1962年中印与外部地缘体之间形成“T”型地缘结构。印度凭借地缘环境优势采取强硬的“前进政策”，中国以军事反击予以回应，中印陷入零和博弈；② 1987年中印与外部地缘体形成“双极联动”结构，印度姿态强硬，中国采取克制与强硬策略，迫使印度退让，冲突呈现正和博弈；③ 2020年中美博弈强化，印度趋于与美国合作“倚美抗中”，多元地缘体的互动形成“辐射-包围型”结构。印度从试探性行动转向激进进攻，中国实施克制与反击并重的策略，冲突强度随之上升，并再次回归零和博弈格局；（2） 机制方面大致总结为：跨领域互动的不完全信息共振、跨尺度耦合与多元行为体博弈的动态协同、地缘环境与博弈的反馈循环等三方面，共同造就和滋生着印度对中印边境冲突的尺度空间错位。印度对中国的误判加大，将地缘环境要素视为钳制中国的工具，且通过“尺度上移-下顺”重组的手段将中印边境问题多边化，在战略调整中不断试探中国底线，形成了地缘环境与冲突博弈的反馈循环。文末从国别地缘环境视角理解中印边境冲突的博弈、为冲突管控与边境冲突和平解决提出对策建议。

The China-India border conflict has exerted profound impacts on bilateral relations, regional security dynamics, and the broader global political landscape. Analyzing its evolutionary game and underlying mechanisms is therefore of great significance. Such analysis helps clarify China's neighboring geo-setting, safeguard its national security, and reveal how complex geographic contexts shape China-India strategic choices and interaction patterns. Based on the theory of country-specific geo-setting and game theory, this study constructs an analytical framework to examine the evolution of China-India border conflicts from the perspective of country-specific geo-setting. By examining typical conflict cases, it explores the evolutionary game process and seeks to reveal the underlying game mechanism. The results show that: (1) the evolutionary process of the game shows a trend of “zero-sum-positive-sum-zero-sum”, which coincides with the changes in the global geo-setting. ① In 1962, China and India formed a T-shaped geostructure with external geopolitical bodies. India adopted a tough “forward policy” by virtue of its geopolitical advantage, and China responded with military counterattacks, plunging China and India into a zero-sum game; ② In 1987, China and India formed a “bipolar linkage” structure with external geopolitical bodies, with India taking a tough stance, and China adopting a strategy of restraint and toughness, forcing India to back down. India's posture is tough, China adopts a restrained and tough strategy, forcing India to back down from the conflict and presenting a positive-sum game; ③ In 2020, China and the United States strengthened the game, India tends to cooperate with the United States, “leaning on the United States to fight against China”, and the interaction of multiple geopolitical bodies forms a “radial-enveloping” structure. India from the exploratory action to radical attack, China to take restraint and counterattack strategy, resulting in the conflict intensity increases and evolved into a zero-sum game. (2) The mechanism is roughly summarized as follows: the incomplete information resonance of cross-domain interaction, the dynamic synergy of cross-scale coupling and multi-actor game, and the feedback loop of geo-setting and game, which together create and nourish India's spatial dislocation of the scale of the China-India border conflict. India's miscalculation of China has increased, and India regards geo-setting factors as a tool to clamp down on China, and multilateralizes the China-India border issue by means of “upward scale shift-downward smoothness” reorganization, and keeps testing China's bottom line in strategic adjustments, thus forming a feedback loop of the game of geo-setting and conflict. Finally, we discuss how to understand the game of China-India border conflicts from the perspective of country-specific geo-setting and put forward countermeasures and suggestions for conflict control and peaceful resolution of the border game.

真诚感谢匿名评审专家在论文评审中所付出的时间和精力，评审专家对本文框架梳理、概念界定及研究结果深入分析等方面的修改意见，使本文获益匪浅。